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NATO has an open door policy on enlargement. Any European country in 
a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to 
security in the Euro-Atlantic area can become a member of the Alliance, when 
invited to do so by the existing member countries.  
After the end of the Cold War, three waves of enlargement – in 1999, 2004 
and  2009  –  have  passed,  and  at  least  one  wave  might  come  up  soon.  For  the 
accession  countries,  joining  NATO  usually  means  a  challenging  transformation 
process.  During  that  process,  the  expectations  of  the  employees  regarding  the 
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forthcoming change have been mostly discarded or neglected. In order to build up a 
concept  regarding  the  expectations  within  a  joining  country,  this  study  would 
contribute in  creating  the practical framework  before  the  next  enlargement.  As 
NATO still continues its enlargement processes, it is crucial to integrate the lessons 
learned  from  previous  enlargements  into  the  next  rounds.  The  study  looks  the 
accession expectations from the organizational point of view and doesn’t go to the 
state level.  
The aim of the current study is to systematize the expectations that the 
members of the aspiration country’s defense forces had towards the forthcoming 
organizational  change  while  joining  NATO,  and  to  explain  the  differences  in 
expectations.  
 
1.  Theoretical framework on the expectations towards  
the organizational change 
 
Psychologists have defined expectations in three ways – as an individual’s 
subjective probability that an act will be followed by a particular outcome; as the 
individual’s subjective probability that a given state either does or will exist; and as 
one person’s belief that another individual will behave in a certain way (Woodman 
& Tolchinsky 1982). The studies on expectations fall into three broad areas each of 
them having the specific research questions in focus – to predict the outcome, to 
explain the situation in case of discrepancies between the expectations and the 
reality (Woodman & Tolchinsky, 1982; King 1974); and to deal with the question 
of controllability of the outcome and its implication for the expectations (Hayes 
1991).  
The first area of study – predicting the outcome - comprises many studies 
concerning self-fulfilling prophecy and the Pygmalion effect (Eden 1984, 1988, 
1990, Henshel 1982, King 1973, 1974, Livingston 2000). Merton defined the self-
fulfilling  prophecy  as  initially  false  definition  of  the  situation  evoking  a  new 
behavior, which makes the originally false conception come true (Merton 1948). 
The Pygmalion effect is a special case of the self-fulfilling prophecy: Pygmalion 
was a sculptor in Greek mythology who carved a statue of a beautiful woman that 
subsequently was brought to life. The essence of this concept is that one person, by 
his effort and will, can transform another person. There are two meta-analyses on 
the matter that summarize the main findings (Kierein & Gold 2000, McNatt 2000).  
The  second  area  of  study  in  the  organizational  research  on  the 
expectations  –  explaining  the  discrepancies  between  the  expectations  and  the 
reality  -  comprises  at  least  three  different  theories  explaining  the  discrepancy 
effects  of  expectations  –  cognitive  dissonance  or  assimilation  theory;  contrast 
theory; and assimilation-contrast theory (Woodman & Tolchinsky 1982). Cognitive 
dissonance  theory  posits  that  if  there  is  a  disparity  between  expectations  for 
outcomes  and  the  objective  outcomes  of  the  intervention,  the  individual  is 
stimulated  to  reduce  the  psychological  tension  by  changing  perception  of  the 
objective outcomes to bring those more into line with initial expectations (Aronson    Volume 11, Issue 4, October  2010            Review of International Comparative Management  668 
&  Carlsmith  1962).  Contrast  theory  assumes  that  if  the  event  fails  to  meet 
expectations the individual will evaluate the outcome less favorably than if the 
person  had  no  prior  expectations  for  it  (Cardozo  1965).  Assimilation-contrast 
theory posits that performance differing only slightly from one’s expectations tends 
to result in displacement of perceptions toward expectations (assimilation), while 
large variances between one’s expectations and actuality tend to be exaggerated 
(contrast) (McClelland et al 1953). In the context of organizational change, the 
management  of  discrepancies  between  the  expectations  and  the  reality  will  be 
especially important in the cases where the organization has failed to achieve the 
expected  outcomes,  i.e.  where  the  discrepancy  is  high.  Otherwise  the 
dissatisfaction  of  employees  might  be  leveraged  and  could  therefore  cause  a 
snowball effect.  
The third area of the expectation studies – controllability of the outcomes – 
bases  on  the  concept  of  learned  helplessness.  This  theory  states  that  when 
individuals  are  subjected  to  events,  which  are  uncontrollable  (that  is  when  the 
probability of an outcome is the same irrespective of how they respond), they will 
develop expectations of non-contingency between response and outcome and these 
expectations will produce motivational and cognitive deficits (Hayes 1991). The 
motivational  deficit  means  that  subjects  become  passive  when  they  experience 
uncontrollable  events  and  this  passivity  continues  over  successive  trials.  The 
cognitive deficit involves a failure to learn that responding can be successful even 
after a response has been made that is successful in controlling the outcome. In 
case of an organizational change, the area of the controllability of the outcomes 
relates to the involvement of employees into the change planning and management 
processes. The more the employees feel that they had some control over the change 
processes the more they are motivated to participate in it.   
The concept of expectations also relate to the theories of motivation. The 
main concept of expectancy theories of motivation is that the motivation of an 
individual to exert a specific amount of effort is a function of the expectation that 
the effort will result in a specific outcome and the sum of valence (personal utilities 
or satisfaction) that the individual expects to derive from the outcomes (Woodman 
& Tolchinsky 1982).  
There have been several developments in the expectancy theory: first, the 
distinction between first level and second level outcomes (i.e. goal accomplishments 
and extrinsic rewards); second, identification of intrinsic sources of valences; third, 
the  distinction  between  expectancy  I,  i.e.  the  subject’s  probability  estimate  that 
his/her effort will lead to first level outcomes, and expectancy II, i.e. the subject’s 
probability estimate that first level outcome will lead to extrinsic rewards; and fourth, 
the  incorporation  of  additional  variables  in  the  model  to  elaborate  in  explaining 
specific job behavior, such as abilities to explain job performance, and the equity 
concept to explain job satisfaction (Wahba, House, 1972). In a way the expectancy 
theories of motivation sum up the three areas of expectation studies. However, the 
studies conducted in this category remain mainly on the individual level and deal 
with interpersonal interactions. In case of organizational change, however, the focus Review of International Comparative Management              Volume 11, Issue 4, October  2010  669 
should be more on the organizational aspects like the differences between various 
levels in the organization (e.g. superiors and subordinates, support functions and core 
functions etc).  
 




The  survey  covered  all  the  services  and  agencies  of  the  aspiration 
country’s defense forces. The survey was conducted in March 2004, i.e. before the 
enlargement of NATO. 
Altogether, 569 subjects (449 men and 116 women, 4 participants did not 
indicate their gender) participated in the survey. It included 237 superiors (having 
at least one subordinate) and 316 subordinates. 16 participants didn’t indicate their 
position. The average age of the participants was 32,6 years (SD = 10,3), ranging 
from 20 to 69 years. 13 participants did not indicate their age. The breakdown by 
age groups is given in table 1. 
 
Breakdown of participants by age groups 
Table 1 
Age groups  Number of respondents  Percentage 
- 30 years  310  55,76% 
31-40  133  23,92% 
41-50  76  13,67% 
51-  37  6,65% 
Total  556   
 
In addition, 5 interviews were conducted with the top executives of the 
defense forces. It included the Chief of Defense, Chief of General Staff, former 
Chief of General Staff, Chief of Navy and Chief of Defense League.  
 
2.2 Methods of analyses 
 
The survey had 30 statements and 7 open-ended questions. The current 
study  concentrated  on  the  responses  of  the  2  open-ended  questions  –  “The 
accession to NATO influences the defense forces in the following areas:”, and 
“What are your expectations regarding the NATO accession?” The 30 statements 
have been analyzed in my previous study regarding the structure of expectations in 
the context of organizational change. The results of that study showed that the 
major categories of expectations in this defense forces were: personal development, 
organizational development, and the relations to the strategic environment. The 
responses of these 2 open-ended questions were systematized and structured based 
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The results from open-ended questions were compared and analyzed with 
the interviews conducted with the top 5 executives. The method was qualitative as 
it tried to understand and explain the differences in expectations.  
 
3.  Results  
 
The main expectation of the top executives was that the identity of the 
members  of  defense  forces  would  change.  They  expected  that  the  way  the 
employees would define themselves in 3-5 years period was not anymore through 
local but rather through global terms - if NATO has a problem outside of the state’s 
territory,  then  the  employees  should  feel  that  it  is  their  problem  as  well.  The 
expressed ideas were the following: “NATO and our policies and activities should 
be combined in every branch and every department”; “every platoon commander 
should understand that we belong to NATO”; “our identity will be broader”; “our 
center of gravity should shift from our own security to the world’s security and to 
the security of NATO. This idea was dominantly present during all the conducted 
interviews; therefore, it could be taken as one of the most important statements of 
the top executives while talking about joining NATO.  
The  next  often  mentioned  topic  stated  by  the  top  executives  was  the 
organizational  development.  It  was  brought  up  as  follows:  “besides  the 
implementation  of  plans  we  should  bring  in  the  topic  of  organizational 
development”; “we should first define our role and functions inside NATO, and 
after that we should determine the organizational structure, which is best for these 
roles and functions”; “we should meet NATO standards in our activities”. This 
topic was expected to come out before conducting the present research because the 
structure of the defense forces and different tasks from Partnership Goals were 
common  topics  in  almost  every  meeting  with  NATO  officials  before  joining 
NATO. The first Force Structure Review was finished in 2001. The second and 
even more comprehensive plan was about to be approved by the government and 
sent to NATO.  
The issue of employees’ well-being was brought out quite rarely. One top 
executive  mentioned  that  “we  should  from  now  on  pay  more  attention  to  our 
employees as some of them haven’t even been able to take out their vacations due 
to their duties and have worked with the high sense of responsibility.” Another top 
executive remarked that “we should develop our officers in order to give them 
possibilities to get good experiences from international missions and international 
staffs”. The focus of top executives was clearly more on external relations, identity 
change and organizational matters rather than on personnel development matters. 
Probably they didn’t see the latter topic as an issue as compared to former topics.  
The  employees  had  a  totally  different  focus.  Without  any  doubt,  the 
biggest expectation of the employees was the rise of their salary. In total, 127 
respondents out of 569 mentioned it in their answers. No other topic could get even 
close  to  that  number.  The  next  often  mentioned  topic  –  better  training  –  was 
mentioned by 62 respondents. Cooperation on the international level, i.e. the topic Review of International Comparative Management              Volume 11, Issue 4, October  2010  671 
most  important  for  top  executives,  was  mentioned  only  by  25  respondents. 
Therefore, it could be assumed that the hottest issue for employees was not the 
NATO or the integration efforts, but their own well-being. In addition to salary, 20 
respondents expected their working environment to improve and 42 expected their 
personal professional and career opportunities to increase. These numbers cannot 
be added up as many respondents who expected for better working environment 
or/and better career opportunities, had mentioned also the need for better salary. 
Nevertheless, the whole picture showed very clear evidence that the enhancements 
in personal development category were the biggest expectation at all.  
The  next  often  mentioned  topic  by  the  employees  was  organizational 
development. Within this topic, the most often mentioned subjects were: 
 
Subjects under the organizational development topic 
Table 2 
Subjects   Number of respondents 
training  62 
equipment  37 
vehicles  19 
exercises  15 
organizational structure  13 
weaponry  12 
 
Although there were no absolute division among the respondents on these 
topics, the general patterns showed some evidence that these topics were usually 
service specific, i.e. the respondents from navy expected new ships, respondents 
from army expected their weaponry to improve and employees from logistic center 
expected better vehicles and weaponry. As training was the biggest peace time task 
for all the services and agencies, the high number of expectations regarding the 
training  is  understandable.  To  generalize  this  result,  it  can  be  said  that  the 
expectations  regarding  the  organizational  development  was  related  to  everyday 
working environment of the respondents.  
Looking at the results, it can be said that there exist a gap between the 
expectations of the top executives and the expectations of the employees regarding 
the accession to NATO.  
 
4.  Discussion 
 
Comparing  the  results  obtained  from  the  interviews  and  from 
questionnaires, it can be concluded that the organization has big communication 
problems,  both  in  terms  of  communicating  the  vision  of  its  top  executives  to 
employees, and also understanding the problems of its employees. Identity change 
due to accession to NATO hasn’t been probably even communicated or has done in 
a way that was not convincing for employees. It might be also that the personal 
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believe that the outer environment would improve their working conditions. It was 
unlikely that these issues haven’t reached to the top executives; however, it seems 
that  these  signals  were  not  taken  seriously  enough.  This  issue  emphasizes  the 
theoretical  gap  of  expectation  studies  –  in  the  context  of  the  organization  the 
expectations of the individuals should also be in harmony with each other in order 
to reach common goals.  
The expectation gap  might have occurred because there were quite big 
changes in work routines during the accession period; new way of thinking had to 
be implemented in quite a short period of time. During the Partnership and Review 
Process (PARP) NATO assigned aspiration countries to prepare several reports. 
The information that was requested by NATO was not easily obtainable from the 
existing  databases.  Therefore,  it  demanded  quite  a  heavy  workload  from  staff 
officers. In addition, some staff officers didn’t possess sufficient English language 
skills to understand the requirements; therefore it imposed more workload for those 
who had the necessary languages skills. In brief, the accession process kept higher 
staffs  under  constant  time  pressure,  so  they  had  very  little  time  for  the 
communication inside the organization. This might be one of the reasons for this 
gap. It shows that during the accession period besides the reports on weaponry, 
personnel, finances etc, NATO could ask for information about the expectation of 
employees regarding the accession or to force the higher staffs otherwise to plan 
some of their time on change management.  
Another generalization that could be made based on the expectations of the 
respondents  in  the  category  of  organizational  development  (both  from  the 
interviews and from the questionnaires) is that the expectations were usually quite 
narrowly concentrated on the everyday work environment and very little on the 
organization as  a  whole. The top executives  who  had  very  close  contacts  with 
NATO agencies and had to organize every day their staffs in a way that could meet 
the  required  standards,  had  the  expectations  that  their  people  should  have  the 
ability to think on the NATO Military Committee level and should think during 
their everyday work in the context of NATO. The people on the ground, who didn’t 
have everyday contacts with their NATO partners, didn’t probably even know what 
to expect from NATO. The only knowledge and basis for their expectations came 
from their own contacts with NATO and this was mainly on the level of joint 
exercises or individual trainings. These topics were also reflected in their responses. 
Interestingly enough, the international missions were mentioned together with the 
higher  salary  and  19  out  of  22  respondents,  who  mentioned  the  international 
missions in their responses, were troops from army, i.e. from the service, which 
mainly covered the international missions. The respondents from navy expected 
more  joint  exercises  as  they  already  held  international  mine  hunting  exercises 
every  year.  The  respondents  from  air  force  expected  that  they  could  get  an 
integrated air picture from NATO etc. Basically, the contacts that the employees 
had had during the accession period with NATO determined their expectations on 
the organizational level. Therefore, in future accessions, NATO could try to get 
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forces as possible in order to make the employees understand what to expect from 
NATO. Certainly, this should be the task of higher staffs, but as higher staffs are 
very  busy  with  their  own  changes,  it  might  be  beneficial  if  NATO  agencies 
instructed the defense forces on this level.  
The issue of gap in expectations and understandings is an interesting side-
result of the present survey. Although in any bigger organization the information 
flow is far from perfect, the occurred situation should have raised an alarm in the 
heads of top executives. The state’s economy in general was growing quite fast and 
the average salaries in the state were growing even faster. As employees expected 
higher salaries because of the accession to NATO, it might mean that they didn’t 
have  much  hope  from  defense  forces  itself  anymore.  It  reflects  the  theory  on 
learned  helplessness  in  a  way  that  employees  didn’t  perceive  anymore  the 
contingency of asking for better working conditions and actually receiving them 
from  their  own  organization.  Although  in  any  organization  people  want  to  get 
higher salaries, it is unlikely that accession to NATO could affect the level of 
salaries in the defense forces. The defense budget is decided by the state and the 
only area that NATO could support financially was investments in the areas where 
NATO and the member state had common interests (e.g. air fields, radars etc). 
Therefore, it can be said that these kinds of expectations were ungrounded and they 
couldn’t have come from higher staffs or from NATO officials. It is difficult to 
prove the direct impact of these unmet expectations on work performance and/or 
motivation;  however,  at  the  end  of  2006  the  chief  of  personnel  department  in 
general staff had to admit publicly in the biggest daily newspaper that the defense 
forces are running out of officers. In addition to officers, there was a high deficit of 
other employees as well. The main reason for the employees leaving the defense 
forces  was  salary.  Defense  forces  don’t  talk  very  often  publicly  about  their 
problems; therefore it can be assumed that in that case the problems have reached 
to  a  critical  level.  The  result  supports  the  contrast  theory  in  a  sense  that  the 
respondents might have exaggerated the variances between their expectations and 
the actuality. Therefore the situation for them might have looked even worse than it 
actually was. The question remains – could this situation be avoided. As the survey 
was  conducted  in  the  beginning  of  2004  and  the  article  in  the  newspaper  was 
published in 2006, it can be assumed that the non-contingency between the desired 
outcome of employees and their efforts lasted at least for 3 years. The motivational 
and cognitive deficits that occurred due to this non-contingency might have led to 
the situation where it attracted already the public’s attention. My assumption is that 
although  public  service  can  never  compete  with  private  sector  on  the  level  of 
income, some of the problems could have certainly be avoided if top management 
had asked for and dealt with the expectations of their employees.  
One reason of this gap might come from the previous weak connectedness 
to NATO structures. There were only a few structures that had an everyday link to 
some NATO bodies. Mainly the general staff dealt with NATO everyday planning 
activities, sometimes service staffs were included. In army, out of seven training 
centers,  only  one  center  dealt  with  peace  keeping  missions.  Another  trained    Volume 11, Issue 4, October  2010            Review of International Comparative Management  674 
specialists  for  missions,  but  the  others  had  a  very  weak  linkage  to  NATO. 
Therefore, the understanding of being the NATO member state in general stayed 
on the political level, i.e. it meant that NATO will provide the security guarantee 





The aim of the current study was to systematize the expectations that the 
members of the aspiration country’s defense forces had towards the forthcoming 
organizational  change  while  joining  NATO  and  to  explain  the  differences  in 
expectations.  
The  expectations  of  the  top  management  differed  a  lot  from  the 
expectations  of the employees.  The  top  management  was  more  focused  on  the 
identity change, whereas employees expected their everyday working conditions to 
improve. The most common expectation of the employees was the rise of salary. 
Such a difference in expectations and therefore probably also the level of unmet 
expectations on the employees level might have caused the situation where the 
defense  forces  had  to  admit  publicly  in  2006  that  there  was  a  high  deficit  of 
officers wanting to work for defense forces.  
The  result  shows  that  there  was  a  gap  between  the  expectations  and 
understandings  of  top  management  and  the  employees.  It  indicates  that  the 
communication  inside the  organization  while  preparing  for the change  was  not 
sufficient. The ideas of the top management either didn’t reach to the lower levels 
or were not convincing. One reason for this gap of expectations and understandings 
might  also  be  due  to  very  high  time  pressure  for  the  higher  staffs  during  the 
accession period. The higher staffs might not have been ready for such an amount 
of new requirements, so they were busy fulfilling them instead of selling their ideas 
to employees. What NATO side could do during the next enlargement processes is 
to interact more directly with all levels of the aspiration countries defense forces so 
that the understanding of NATO system would be easier to explain. 
In conclusion, during the big organizational changes the time pressure for 
the top management, which is conducting the change, takes a lot of energy and 
doesn’t allow dedicating sufficient time on communicating the change. Therefore, 
the  expectations  towards  the  outcome  of  that  change  might  differ  significantly 
along the organizational hierarchy. If such a gap is big, then the consequences of 
unmet expectations might lead to organizational crisis in terms of leaving the job or 
unfulfilling the organizational tasks. Therefore, if the management knows better the 
expectations of the members of the organization, then it is possible to be proactive 
in foreseeing the forthcoming challenges. 
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